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2 2 Objectivity and Subjectivity
1 Introduction
It is a commonplace that macroscopic laws, in particular the second law of thermody-
namics (“entropy increases”), are true only in a probabilistic sense. But if one restricts
oneself to classical physics, its laws are deterministic, so one might ask: where do these
probabilities come from? How to make sense of objective probabilities in a deterministic
universe? And if those probabilities are in some sense “subjective”, namely assigned by
us to events, and not “intrinsic” to those events, how can one say that macroscopic laws
are objective?
Since the flow of heat from hot to cold is a perfectly objective fact and is law-like in
its universality, should one say that our explanations of this fact are unsatisfactory if they
rely on non-objective probabilities?
Our goal here is to try to answer these questions and to disentangle certain confusions
that those questions tend to create.
We will start with general considerations about objectivity and subjectivity in science
and also in different notions of probability.
Then we will explain how probabilities enter in the explanation of both equilibrium
statistical mechanics and in the approach to equilibrium. We will illustrate the latter
through a simple example, the Kac ring model. For related work in the same spirit, see
e.g. [2, 6, 7].
2 Objectivity and Subjectivity
There is a constant tension in the history of philosophy (and of science) between people
who think that our thoughts are produced by our minds with little connection to the
world (‘idealists’) and those who think that they are the result of an interaction between
our mind and a mind-independent “outside world” (‘realists’). At one extreme, one finds
solipsism, everything going on in our mind is just like a dream or an internal movie, at
3the other extreme, one finds naive realists, for whom reality is “objectively” what it looks
like, including colors, odors etc. It is not my ambition here to resolve this issue or even
to discuss it adequately, although I am on the (non-naive) realist side.
Coming back to science, one may distinguish, even from a realist point of view, different
degrees of “objectivity”:
1. Facts. It is about facts that our intuition of objectivity is strongest: I am right now
writing on a computer, the moon is there even if nobody looks at it, rivers flows
and the sun shines when it does. An idealist might deny all this, but it is hard to
be a realist without accepting the existence of facts “out there”, independent of my
consciousness.
2. Laws. We all know that there are regularities in Nature and it is a priori reasonable
to think of those regularities as being part of Nature and to call them laws of
Nature. Someone who is a realist about facts might deny the reality of laws over
and above the so-called Humean mosaic of empirical facts, considering them as a
mere human tool to summarize the observed regularities.3 We will not analyze this
issue here and simply admit, for the sake of the discussion, the objectivity of the
laws of Nature. Moreover, one can introduce a hierarchy of such laws: there are
fundamental laws, governing the behavior of the most microscopic constituents of
matter and derived or phenomenological laws describing the behavior of aggregate
sets of such particles. For example, if “heat is molecular motion”, then the laws
governing heat are phenomenological but those governing the molecular motions are
fundamental.4
3. Explanations. There is a common (mis)-conception according to which the role of
science is to describe and to predict but not to explain. However, if one asks: ”why
does it rain today?”, one is asking for an explanation of a given fact and the answer
3 See Maudlin [18] for a discussion of realism about laws versus the “Humean” conception.
4 At least to a first approximation: one may consider the molecules as being made of more funda-
mental entities, whose laws would be truly fundamental, while those governing the molecules would be
phenomenological. But, since we do not know what are really the ultimate constituent of matter, this
fundamental/phenomenological distinction is relative to a given context.
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will involve laws of meteorology and empirical data concerning that past situation
of the atmosphere. So, it will be an explanation and it will be scientific.
Science is in fact full of explanations: the theory of gravitation explains the regu-
larities in the motion of planets, moons or satellites. The atomic theory of matter
explains the proportions of elements in chemical reactions. Medical science explains
in principle what cures a disease, etc.
The misconception arises because people often think of “ultimate” explanations, like:
why is there something rather than nothing? Or, how did the Universe (including
the Big Bang) come to exist? But, if one puts aside those metaphysical/religious
questions to which nobody has an answer, science does provide explanations of
observable phenomena.
Of course, the question: “what constitutes a valid explanation?”, specially when
probabilities are involved, is a tricky one and we will discuss it in sections 5 and 6.
4. Probabilities. If one puts oneself in the framework of classical physics (in order
to avoid quantum subtleties) then laws are deterministic which means that, given
some initial conditions, future events either occur or do not occur. There is no
sense in which they are, by themselves, probable or improbable. Yet, scientists use
probabilities all the time. Although there is a school of thought that tries to give
an objective meaning to the notion of probability (we will discuss it below), there
must be something “human” about probabilities in the sense that we may use them
in certain ways and have good reasons to do so, but probabilities are not expressing
objective facts about the world, independent of us, like, say, the motion of the moon.
3 Two Notions of Probability
There are, traditionally, at least two different meanings given to the word ‘probability’
in the natural sciences. These two meanings are well-known but, since much confusion
arises from the fact that the same word is used to denote two very different concepts, let
us start by recalling them and explain how one can connect the two. First, we speak of
5‘the natural sciences’, because we do not want to discuss the purely mathematical notion
of probability as measure (the notion introduced by Kolmogorov and others). This is of
course an important branch of mathematics and the notion of probability used here, when
formalized, will coincide with that mathematical notion, but we want to focus here on the
role played by probabilities in our scientific theories, which is not reducible to a purely
mathematical concept.
So, the first notion that comes to mind is the so-called ‘objective’ or ‘statistical’ one,
i.e. the view of probability as something like a ‘theoretical frequency’: if one says that
the probability of the event E under condition X, Y, Z equals p, one means that, if one
reproduces the conditions X, Y, Z sufficiently often, the event E will appear with frequency
p. Of course, ‘sufficiently often’ is vague and this is the source of much criticism of that
notion of probability. But, putting that objection aside for a moment and assuming that
‘sufficiently often’ can be given a precise meaning in concrete circumstances, probabilistic
statements are, according to this view, factual statements that can be confirmed or refuted
by observations or experiments.
By contrast, the ‘subjective’ or Bayesian use of the word ‘probability’ refers to a form
of reasoning and not to a factual statement. Used in that sense, assigning a probability
to an event expresses a rational judgment on the likelihood of that single event, based on
the information available at that moment. Note that, here, one is not interested in what
happens when one reproduces many times the ‘same’ event, as in the objective approach,
but in the probability of a single event. This is of course very important in practice: when
I wonder whether I need to take my umbrella because it will rain, or whether the stock
market will crash next week, I am not mainly interested in the frequencies with which
such events occur but with what will happen here and now; of course, these frequencies
may be part of the information that is used in arriving at a rational judgment on the
probability of a single event, but, in general, they are not the only information available.
How does one assign subjective probabilities to an event? In elementary textbooks,
a probability is defined as the ratio between the number of favorable outcomes and the
number of ‘possible’ ones. While the notion of favorable outcome is easy to define, the one
of possible outcome is much harder. Indeed, for a Laplacian demon, nothing is uncertain
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and the only possible outcome is the actual one; hence, all probabilities are zeroes or ones.
But we are not Laplacian demons and it is here that ignorance enters.5 We try to reduce
ourselves to a series of cases about which we are ‘equally ignorant’, i.e. the information
that we do have does not allow us to favour one case over the other, and that defines the
number of ‘possible’ outcomes. The standard examples include the throwing of a dice or
of a coin, where the counting is easy, but that situation is not typical. At the time of
Laplace, this method was called the ‘principle of indifference’; its modern version is the
maximum entropy principle. Here one assigns to each probability distribution p = (pi)
N
i=1
its Shannon entropy, given by:
S(p) = −
N∑
i=1
pi ln pi.
One then chooses the probability distribution that has the maximum entropy, among those
that satisfy certain constraints that incorporate the information that we have about the
system.
The rationale, like for the indifference principle, is not to introduce bias in our judg-
ments, namely information that we do not have (like people who believe in lucky numbers).
And one can reasonably argue that maximizing the Shannon entropy is indeed the best
way to formalize that notion, see [22, 14], [15, section 11.3].
In practice, one starts by identifying a space of states in which the system under consid-
eration can find itself and one assigns a prior distribution to it (maximizing the Shannon
entropy, given the information available at the initial time), which is then updated when
new information becomes available.6 Note that probabilistic statements, understood sub-
jectively, are forms of reasoning, although not deductive ones. Therefore, one cannot
check them empirically, because reasonings, whether they are inductive or deductive, are
either correct or not, but that depends on the nature of the reasoning not on any facts.
If someones says: Socrates is an angel; all angels are immortal; therefore Socrates is
immortal, it is a valid (deductive) reasoning. Likewise, if all we know about a coin is
that it has two faces and that it looks symmetric, therefore the probability of ‘head’ is
5 This was of course Laplace’s main point in [17], although this is is often misunderstood. Laplace
emphasized that human intelligence will forever remain ‘infinitely distant’ from the one of his demon.
6 For an introduction to Bayesian updating, see e.g. [14, 15].
7one half, it is a valid probabilistic reasoning; throwing the coin a thousand times with a
result that is always tails does not disprove the reasoning; it only indicates that the initial
assumption (of symmetry) was probably wrong (just as watching Socrates dead leads one
to reconsider the notion that he is an angel or that the latter are immortal); the main
point of Bayesianism is to give rules that allow to update one’s probabilistic estimates,
given previous observations.
Let us now consider some frequent objections to this “subjective” notion of probability.
1. Subjectivism. Some people think that a Bayesian view of probabilities presupposes
of some form of subjectivism, meant as a doctrine in philosophy or philosophy of
science that regards what we call knowledge as basically produced by “subjects”
independently of any connection to the “outside world”. But there is no logical
link here: a subjectivist about probabilities may very well claim that there are
objective facts in the world and that the laws governing it are also objective, and
consider probabilities as being a tool used in situations where our knowledge of
those facts and those laws is incomplete. In fact, one could argue that, if there is
any connection between Bayesianism and philosophical subjectivism, it goes in the
opposite direction; a Bayesian should naturally think that one and only one among
the ‘possible’ states is actually realized, and that there is a difference between what
really happens in the world and what we know about it. But the philosophical
subjectivist position often starts by confusing the world and our knowledge of it
(for example, much of loose talk about everything being ‘information’ often ignores
the fact that ‘information’ is ultimately information about something which itself is
not information).
Besides, ignorance does enter in the computations of probabilities but, as we will
see in the next section, when we discuss the connection between probabilities and
physics, this does not mean that either knowledge or ignorance are assumed to play
a fundamental role in physics.
2. Determinism. One may object that Bayesians are committed to a deterministic
view of the world: since Bayesians regard probabilities as subjective, doesn’t this
8 3 Two Notions of Probability
deny the possibility that phenomena be intrinsically or genuinely random? Not nec-
essarily. A Bayesian may be agnostic concerning the issue of intrinsic randomness
and point out that it is difficult to find an argument showing the presence of intrinsic
randomness in nature; indeed, it is well-known that some deterministic dynamical
systems (the ‘chaotic’ ones) pass all the statistical tests that might indicate the pres-
ence of ‘randomness’.7 So, how can we know, when we observe some irregular and
unpredictable phenomenon, that this phenomenon is ‘intrinsically random’ rather
than simply governed by unknown, but ‘chaotic’, deterministic laws?
3. (Ir)relevance to physics. One may think that the Bayesian approach is useful in
games of chance or in various practical problems of forecasting (like in insurances)
but not for physics. Our answer will be based on the law of large numbers discussed
in the next section.
The main point of this discussion is that there is nothing arbitrary or subjective in the
assignment of “subjective” probabilities. The word “subjective” here simply refers to the
fact that there are no true or real probabilities “out there”. But the choice of probabilities
obeys rules (maximizing Shannon’s entropy and doing Bayesian updating) that do not
depend of any individual’s whims, although it does depend on his or her information.8
7 Here is a simple example of such a system. Let I = [0, 1[ and let f : I → I be given by f(x) = 2x
mod 1. Then, writing x ∈ I as x =∑∞n=1 an2n , with an = 0, 1, we see that the map f is equivalent to the
shift σ on sequences a = (an)
∞
n=1, σ(a)n = an+1. Using this observation, and the fact that the Lebesgue
measure on I is equivalent to the product measure on the sequences a giving a weight 12 to both 0 and 1,
one can check that the map f is equivalent to a sequence of “random” coin tossings with an = 0 being,
say, “head” and an = 1 being “tail”. So, that simple deterministic system will look as random as any
apparently random system. For more fancy “chaotic” dynamical systems, see [3, 4, 10, 23, 20, 21].
8 A further confusion arrises from the fact that some probabilists, the Italian Bruno de Finetti being
the best known one, do consider probabilities as expressing purely subjective degrees of beliefs that
are constrained only by rules of consistency, see e.g. [8, 9]. These probabilists are sometimes called
“subjective Bayesians”; the view presented here is then called “objective Bayesian”, see [14, p. 4] and
[15, p. 655] for a discussion of the difference between these views.
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A way to make a connection between the two views on probability goes through the law of
large numbers: the calculus of probabilities – viewed now as part of deductive reasoning
– leads one to ascribe subjective probabilities close to one for certain events that are
precisely those that the objective approach deals with, namely the frequencies with which
some events occur, when we repeat many times the ‘same’ experiment. So, rather than
opposing the two views, one should carefully distinguish them, but regard the objective
one as, in a sense, derived from the subjective one (i.e. when the law of large numbers
leads to subjective probabilities sufficiently close to one). Let us state the law of large
numbers, using a terminology that will be useful when we turn to statistical mechanics
below. Consider the simple example of coin tossing. Let 0 denote ‘head’ and 1, ‘tail’.
The ‘space’ of results of any single tossing, {0, 1}, will be called the ‘individual phase
space’ while the space of all possible results of N tossings, {0, 1}N , will be called the
‘total phase space’. In statistical physics, the individual phase space will be R3 (if one
considers only the positions or only the velocities of the particles) or R6 (if one considers
both the positions and the velocities of the particles) and the total phase space will be
R3N or R6N for N particles. The variables N0, N1 that count the number of heads (0) or
tails (1) in N tossings are called macroscopic.
Here we introduce an essential distinction between the macroscopic variables, or the
macrostate, and the microstate. The microstate, for N tossing, is the sequence of re-
sults for all the tossings, while the macrostate simply specifies the values of N0 and N1.
Although this example is trivial, let us draw the following analogy with statistical me-
chanics: N0 and N1 for a given point in the total phase space (a sequence of results for
all the tossings), count the number of ‘particles’ that belong to a given subset (0 or 1) of
the individual phase space.
Now, fix  > 0 and define a sequence of sets of microstates TN ⊂ {0, 1}N to be typical,
for a given sequence of probability measures PN on {0, 1}N , if
PN(TN )→ 1. (1)
as N →∞. If the typical sets TN are defined by a property, we will also call that property
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typical.9
Let GN() be the set of microstates such that
|N0
N
− 1
2
| ≤  (2)
Here the letter G stand for “good”, because we will use the same expression below in the
context of statistical mechanics.
Then, (a weak form of) the law of large numbers states that, ∀ > 0,
PN(GN())→ 1 (3)
as N → ∞, where PN the product measure on {0, 1}N that assigns independent proba-
bilities 1
2
to each outcome of each tossing. This is the measure that one would assign on
the basis of the indifference principle: give an equal probability to all possible sequences
of results. In other words, what (3) expresses is that the sequence of sets GN() is typical
in the sense of definition (1), ∀ > 0.
A more intuitive way to say the same thing is that, if we simply count the number of
microstates that belong to GN(), we find that they form a fraction of the total number
of microstates close to 1, for N large.
The situation becomes more complicated but more interesting if one tries to under-
stand what could be a probabilistic explanation, like the explanation of the second law of
thermodynamics.
5 Explanations and probabilistic explanations
A first form of scientific explanation is given by laws. If state A produces state B, according
to deterministic laws, then the occurrence of B can be explained by the occurrence of A and
the existence of those laws.10 If A is prepared in the laboratory, this kind of explanation
is rather satisfactory, since the initial state A is produced by us.
9 This use of the word typical is not exactly the usual one, which refers to the probability of a given
set, not a sequence of sets, to be close to 1.
10 This is the main idea behind the deductive nomological model, according to which scientific explana-
tions are deductive arguments with laws as one of the premises (see Hempel [12], Hempel and Oppenheim
[13]).
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But if B is some natural phenomena, like today’s weather and A is some meteorological
condition yesterday, then A itself has to be explained, and that leads potentially to an
“infinite” regress, going back in principle to the beginning of the universe. In practice,
nobody goes back that far, and A is simply taken to be “given”, namely our explanations
are in practice limited.
It is worth noting that there is something “anthropomorphic” even in this type of
explanation: for example if A is something very special, one will try to explain A as
being caused by anterior events that are not so special. Otherwise our explanation of B in
terms of A will look unsatisfactory. Both the situations A and B and the laws are perfectly
objective but the notion of explanation is “subjective” in the sense that it depends on
what we, humans, regard as a valid explanation.
Consider now a situation where probabilities are involved, take the simplest example,
coin tossing, and try to use that example to build up our intuition about what constitutes
a valid explanation.
First observe that, if we toss a coin many times and we find approximately half heads
and half tails, we do not feel that there is anything special to be explained. If, however,
the result deviates strongly from that average, we’ll look for an explanation (e.g. by
saying that the coin is biased).
This leads to the following suggestion: suppose that we want to explain some phe-
nomenon when our knowledge of the past is such that this phenomenon could not have
been predicted with certainty (for coin tossing, the past would be the initial conditions
of the coins when they are tossed). We will say that our knowledge, although partial,
is sufficient to explain that phenomenon if we would have predicted it using Bayesian
probabilities and the information we had about the past. That notion of ‘explanation’
incorporates, of course, as a special case, the notion of explanation based on laws. Also,
it fits with our intuition concerning the coin-tossing situation discussed above: being ig-
norant of any properties of the coin leads us to predict a fraction of heads or tails around
one-half. Hence, such a result is not surprising or, in other words, does not “need to be
explained”, while a deviation from it requires an explanation.
Turning to physics, consider for example the Maxwellian distribution of velocities, for
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a free gas of N particles of mass m. Let ∆(~u), be the cubic cell of size δ3 centered around
~u ∈ (δZ)3. Let v = (~v1, . . . , ~vN) ∈ R3N , with each ~vi ∈ R3, be an element of the ‘phase
space’ of the system (where the spatial coordinates are ignored), i.e. a configuration of
velocities for all the particles, which is what we call a microstate of the system.
Define the macrostate by the set of variables {N~u(v)}~u∈(δZ)3 :
N~u(v) = |{i|~vi ∈ ∆(~u), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}}|. (4)
N~u(v) is also called the empirical distribution corresponding to the phase space point v.
It counts, for each ∆(~u) and for a given set of velocities of all the particles, the number
of particles whose velocities lie in ∆(~u).
This is analogous to counting the number of heads or tails in a given sequence of coin
tosses or the number of times a dice falls on a given face when it is thrown many times.
Let GN(, δ), for given , δ, be the set of “good” vectors v for which
|N~u(v)
N
− exp(−
m|~u|2
2kT
)
(2pimkT )3/2
| ≤ , (5)
∀~u ∈ (δZ)3.
Let SE,N be the constant energy surface of energy E, namely the subset of R3N defined
by:
SE,N = {v = (~v1, . . . , ~vN)|
N∑
i=1
m|~vi|2
2
= E} (6)
and let µE,N be the uniform measure on that surface (i.e. the restriction of the Lebesgue
measure in R3N to that surface).
Then, a variant of the law of large numbers says that, for every , δ, the sequence of
sets GN(, δ) is typical, in the sense of (1) for the sequence of probability measures µE,N ,
if T in (5) is related to E in (6) by kT = 2E
3N
, which means that the set GN(, δ) has, for
N large, a measure µE,N close to one when kT =
2E
3N
holds. This is a precise way of saying
that the distribution of velocities for a gas of N particles of mass m is Maxwellian.
If someone asks: how does one explain the occurrence of this Maxwellian distribution?
The Bayesian answer is basically that there is nothing to explain, because this is analogous
to the situation of coin tossings when the fractions of heads and tails are both close to one
half. Given that we know that the energy is conserved, symmetry considerations show
13
that the uniform measure is the most natural one and, since the Maxwellian distribution is
the empirical distribution corresponding to most phase points (relative to that measure),
it is exactly what we would expect if we know nothing more about the system. In fact,
the only thing that would lead us not to predict the Maxwellian distribution would be
some additional knowledge about the system (e.g. that there are some constraints or some
external forces acting on it).
This answers the often heard question: “how does one justify the choice of the equi-
librium measure?”, namely here the measure µE,N of SE,N : it is the natural choice on
Bayesian grounds.
However, one can ask a related question, which is less trivial: how does one explain
the approach to equilibrium for a closed system which starts in a nonequilibrium config-
uration? This is the question that Boltzmann’s analysis answers and is the topic of the
next section.
6 Time evolution and probabilistic explanations
6.1 Microstates and macrostates
We start by generalizing the notion of macrostate introduced in section 5. Let x(t) be
the microstate of a classical mechanical system on N particles, namely
x(t) = (~q1(t), ~q2(t), . . . ~qN(t), ~p1(t), ~p2(t), . . . , ~pN(t)) ∈ R6N ,
where ~qi(t) ∈ R3 and ~pi(t) ∈ R3 are the position and the momentum of the ith particle at
time t.
Let
x(0)→ x(t) = T tx(0)
denote the flow in R6N induced by Hamilton’s equations for that system and let Ω denote
a bounded subset of R6N invariant under that flow (for example a bounded constant
energy surface).
Here, a macrostate is simply a map F : Ω → Rn with n, the number of macroscopic
variables, being much smaller than 6N : n << 6N .
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We can give, using (4), a simple example of such a map, by letting F = F (x) =
(N~u(v)
N
)~u∈(δZ)3 .11 To give another example, let, as above, ∆(~u) be the cubic cell of size
δ3 centered around ~u ∈ (δZ)3 and let q = (~q1, . . . , ~qN) ∈ R3N , be an element of the
‘configuration space’ of the system, i.e. a configuration of the positions for all the particles.
Define
N~u(q) = |{i|~qi ∈ ∆(~u), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}}|. (7)
Assume that the particles are enclosed in a box Λ which is a union of cubic cells of size
δ3, and let F = F (x) = (N~u(q)
N
)∆(~u)⊂Λ. Here n is the number of cubic cells of size δ3 in Λ,
or |Λ|
δ3
.
Note that the density function is simply a continuous approximation to the function F
(obtained in the limit N →∞, δ → 0). One could also do that in the space R6, combining
both positions and momenta of the particles. In that case, the continuous approximation
to F is Boltzmann’s f function.
Now, one can associate to the evolution x(0) → x(t) = T tx(0) an induced evolution
F0 → Ft, obtained by:
F0 = F (x(0))→ Ft = F (x(t)). (8)
A natural question is whether the evolution of F is autonomous, i.e. independent of
the x(0) mapped onto F0. If it is, then one can say that the evolution of Ft, which is called
a macroscopic law, has been reduced to or derived from the microscopic one x(0)→ x(t),
in a straightforward way.
But such an autonomous evolution is, in general, impossible, because the evolution
x(0)→ x(t) is reversible meaning that, if I denotes the operation:
I(x(t)) = (q1(t),q2(t), . . .qN(t),−p1(t),−p2(t), . . . ,−pN(t)), (9)
one has:
T tIT tx(0) = Ix(0), (10)
or, in words, if one lets the system evolve according to the dynamical laws for an amount
of time t, if one then reverses the velocities (or the momenta), and if, finally, one lets
11 A small caveat: here the number n of macroscopic variables seems to be infinite, since ~u ∈ (δZ)3, but
the number of non-zero values of N~u(v) is finite, since, because of (6), N~u(v) will be 0 if |~u| > 2Em + 3δ2 .
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the system evolve according those same laws for the same amount of time t, one gets the
initial state with the velocities reversed.
But the evolution F0 → Ft is often irreversible, for example if F is the density and if
one starts with a non-uniform density, the evolution of F tends to a uniform density and
will not return to a non-uniform one.
Yet the reversibility argument shows that, since changing the sign of the velocities
does not change the density, for each microstate x(t) = T tx(0) giving rise to a given
value of Ft = F (x(t)), there may exist another microstate I(x(t)) giving rise to the same
value of Ft = F (I(x(t))) but such that the future time evolution of Ft will be markedly
different depending on whether it is induced by x(t) or by I(x(t)). So, the evolution of
the macrostate cannot be autonomous in the sense given here.
This seems to imply that one cannot derive a macroscopic law from a microscopic
one and in particular that one cannot give a microscopic derivation of the second law
of thermodynamics implying that the entropy monotonically increases. Yet, as we will
explain now, this can be done, but not in the straightforward way suggested above.
6.2 Derivation of macroscopic laws from microscopic ones
The basis of the solution to the apparent difficulty mentioned in the previous subsection
is that the map F is many to one in a way that depends on value taken by F !
To explain that, think again of the simple example of N coin tossings with F= number
of heads and the microstates being the sequence of results e.g. (H,T,H,H, . . . , T ).
If F = N , it corresponds to a unique microstate (H,H,H,H, . . . , H)
But if F = N
2
then there are approximately 2
N√
N
microstates giving rise to that value
of F .
If one considers the density function, it is easy to see that if the box Λ is divided in two
equal parts, the volume in phase space where the particles are uniformly distributed in Λ
will be of the order of 2N times larger than the one where the particles are concentrated
in one of those parts.
In figure 1, one has a schematic illustration of this fact12: each region in Ω corresponds
12 Figures 1, 2, 3 are inspired by similar pictures in chapter 7 of [19].
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Thermal equilibrium
Ω1
Ω0
Ω2Ω3
Ω
Fig. 1: A partition of the phase space Ω (represented by the entire square) into regions
Ω0, Ω1, Ω2, . . . corresponding to microstates that are macroscopically indistin-
guishable from one another, i.e. that give rise to the same value of F . The region
labelled “thermal equilibrium” corresponds to the value of F corresponding to the
overwhelming majority of microstates.
to the set of microstates giving rise to the same value of F and we denote these regions
by Ω0, Ω1, Ω2, . . . . Let us stress that the figures 1, 2, 3 are highly “abstract” since the
phase space Ω represented there by a two-dimensional square is in reality a subset of a
space of dimension of order 1023.
Moreover, F usually takes a continuum of values and in figure 1 we do as if those
values were discrete. But that is only in order to simplify our illustration.
In the example of coin tossing, the region labelled equilibrium in figure 1 corresponds
to having approximately as many heads and tails, i.e. the set of coin tossings defined
by (2). The region Ω0 may correspond to having approximately one third heads and
two third tails, Ω1 may correspond to having approximately one quarter heads and three
quarters tails, etc.
In the example of the gas in the box, the region labelled “thermal equilibrium” in
figure 1 corresponds to an approximate uniform distribution of the particles in the box
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and an approximate Maxwellian distribution of their velocities.13
The region Ω0 in figure 1 might correspond to all the particles being in one half of
the box, another region might correspond to all the particles being in the other half, yet
another region, say Ω1, might correspond to all the particles being in an even smaller part
of the box etc.
Of course, nothing is drawn to scale here: if the size of the region in the phase space
where all the particles are concentrated in one part of the box is 2−N smaller than the one
where the particles are uniformly distributed in Λ, and N is of the order of the Avogadro’s
number, N ∼ 1023, that region where all the particles are concentrated in one part of the
box could not be seen at all if things were drawn to scale.
The thermal equilibrium region is almost equal to the entire phase space Ω and all
the non-equilibrium regions put together (all the particles concentrated in one part of the
box, or the distribution of the velocities being different from the Maxwellian one) occupy
only a tiny fraction of Ω.
To understand how Ft can evolve irreversibly even though its evolution is induced by
a reversible microscopic evolution, consider figure 2, which illustrates what one expects to
happen: the microstate x(t) evolves towards larger and larger regions of phase space and
eventually ends up in the “thermal equilibrium” region. Therefore, the induced evolution
of Ft = F (x(t)) should tend towards equilibrium. However, at the level of generality
considered here, our expectation is simply based on the fact that some regions are (much)
bigger than others, and so it would be natural for the microstate x(t) to evolves towards
those bigger regions if nothing prevents it from doing so.
There are several caveats here: one is that this scenario is what one expects or hopes
for. We will give in the next section an example, a rather artificial one, where this scenario
can be demonstrated in detail, which shows that this scenario is certainly possible and
even plausible, but it is certainly not demonstrated in any degree of generality in physically
natural situations.
The more important caveat is that, even if this scenario is true, the desired evolution
13 We use the word “approximate” here, because, as for coin tossing, for a finite number of particles,
the correspondence with the predicted statistical distribution is always approximate.
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Ω0
Ω1
Ω2Ω3
Ω
Thermal equilibrium
x (t )=T t x (0)
x (0)
Fig. 2: The curve x(t) = T tx(0) describes a possible evolution of a microstate, which tends
to enter regions of larger volume until it enters the region of thermal equilibrium.
is definitely not true for all microstates x(t) = T tx(0) giving rise to a given value Ft =
F (x(t)). That follows from the reversibility argument given in subsection 6.1: for every
microstate x(t) that induces the irreversible evolution of Ft = F (x(t)) there exists another
microstate I(x(t)) so that Ft = F (I(x(t))) at time t, but I(x(t)) induces a different
evolution than the irreversible one for times later than t.
Let us illustrate this explanation of irreversibility in a concrete physical example.
Consider the gas introduced in subsection 6.1 that is initially compressed by a piston
in one-half of the box Λ, and that expands into the whole box. Let F be the density
of the gas. Initially, it is equal to 1 (say) in one half of the box and to 0 in the other
half. After some time t, it is (approximately) equal to 1
2
everywhere. The explanation
of the irreversible evolution of F is that the overwhelming majority of the microscopic
configurations corresponding to the gas in one-half of the box, will evolve deterministically
so as to induce the observed evolution of F . There may of course be some exceptional
configurations, for which all the particles stay in the left half. All one is saying is that
those configurations are extraordinarily rare, and that we do not expect to see even one
of them appearing when we repeat the experiment many times. So, the microscopic
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Fig. 3: Ω0 are the configurations in one-half of the box at time zero; Ω0,G are the
good configurations in Ω0 whose evolution lead to a uniform density at time t:
T t(Ω0,G) ⊂ Ωt; I(T t(Ω0,G)) are the configurations of T t(Ω0,G) with velocities re-
versed whose evolution after time t belongs to Ω0: T
t(I(T t(Ω0,G)) ⊂ Ω0.
configurations that lead to the expected macroscopic behavior will be typical in the sense
of (1).
Let us define the good configurations (up to a certain time T ) as being those con-
figurations that induce the macroscopic law up to time T , and the bad configurations
(up to a certain time T ) the other configurations; we will use indices G and B for the
corresponding sets of configurations.14
Now, take all the good microscopic configurations in one-half of the box, and let them
evolve up to a time t << T , when the density is approximately uniform. Now, reverse all
14 We introduce the time upper bound T here, because, if we wait long enough, all configurations will be
bad, since the Poincare´’s recurrence theorem (see e.g. [1]) implies that they will all come back arbitrarily
close to their initial conditions. In the example of the gas in the box, this means that all the particles will
come back simultaneously to the half-box in which they were initially, which is contrary to the behavior
predicted by the macroscopic laws. But the time needed for a Poincare´’s recurrence to occur in a large
system is typically much larger than the age of the Universe, so that, from a practical point of view, we
may take T =∞.
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the velocities. We get a set of configurations that still determines a density approximately
1
2
in the box, so the value of the density function F , defined by (7), is unchanged. However,
those configurations are not good any more. Indeed, from now on, if the system remains
isolated, the density just remains uniform according to the macroscopic laws. But for the
configurations just described, the gas will move back to the part of the box that they
started from, see (10), leading to a gross violation of the macroscopic law. What is the
solution? Simply that those “reversed-velocities” configurations form a very tiny subset
of all the microscopic configurations giving rise to a uniform density. And, of course,
the original set of configurations, those coming from the initial half of the box, also form
such a small subset. Most configurations corresponding to a uniform density do not go to
one-half of the box, either in the future or in the past.
To express this idea in formulas, let Ωt be the set of the configurations giving to the
function F its value Ft at time t. In other words, Ωt is the pre-image of Ft under the
map F . Let Ωt,G be the set of good configurations, at time t, namely those that lead to a
behavior of F following the macroscopic laws, up to some time T >> t.
One expects that, in general, Ωt,G is a very large subset of Ωt (meaning that
|Ωt,B |
|Ωt| =
|Ωt\Ωt,G|
|Ωt| << 1), but is not identical to Ωt (see (12) below for a more precise statement).
In our example of the gas initially compressed in one-half of the box Λ, the set Ω0
consists of all the configurations in one-half of the box at time zero, and Ω0,G is the subset
consisting of those configurations whose evolution lead to a uniform density at time t,
which means that T t(Ω0,G) ⊂ Ωt.
Microscopic reversibility says that T t(I(T t(Ω0,G)) = I(Ω0,G) ⊂ I(Ω0) = Ω0 (this is just
(10) applied to the set Ω0,G). The last equality holds because the set of configurations in
one-half of the box is invariant under the change of the sign of the velocities.
A paradox would occur if T t(I(Ωt)) ⊂ I(Ω0) = Ω0. Indeed, this would mean that, if
one reverses the velocities of all the configurations at time t corresponding to a uniform
density, and let them evolve for a time t, one would get a set of configurations in one-half of
the box (with velocities reversed). Since the operation I preserves the Lebesgue measure
|I(Ωt)| = |Ωt|, this would imply that there are as many configurations corresponding to
a uniform density (configurations in Ωt) as there are configurations that will evolve back
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to one-half of the box in time t (those in I(T t(Ω0,G)). Or, in other words, one would
have I(Ωt) ⊂ Ωt,B = Ωt \ Ωt,G, which combined with |I(Ωt)| = |Ωt| makes the bound
|Ωt,B |
|Ωt| =
|Ωt\Ωt,G|
|Ωt| << 1 impossible.
But Ωt is not at all equal, in general, to T
t(Ω0,G), so that T
t(I(T t(Ω0,G)) = I(Ω0,G) ⊂
I(Ω0) = Ω0 does not imply T
t(I(Ωt)) ⊂ I(Ω0) = Ω0. In our example, T t(Ω0,G) is a tiny
subset of Ωt, because most configurations in Ωt were not in half of the box at time zero.
This is illustrated in figure 3: Ω0 is the set of configurations with all the particles in
one-half of the box, and Ω0,G the subset of those that evolve towards a uniform distri-
bution after some time t. Thus T t(Ω0,G) is a subset of Ωt, which is the set of thermal
equilibrium states. Reversing the velocities of every configurations in T t(Ω0,G) yields the
set I(T t(Ω0,G)), which is also a subset of Ωt, but a “bad” subset, namely one that does not
stay in equilibrium but moves back to the half box where the particles were to start with.
So, F applied to those configurations will not evolve according to the usual macroscopic
laws (which implies that the density stays uniform in the half box), which is what we
mean by bad configurations.
Of course it should be emphasized once more that the subsets in figure 3 are not
drawn to scale: the sets Ω0, T
t(Ω0,G) and I(T
t(Ω0,G)) are minuscule compared to the set
of equilibrium configurations Ωt.
In fact, one knows from Liouville’s theorem15 that the size of Ω0,G and T
t(Ω0,G) are
equal: |Ω0,G| = |T t(Ω0,G)|. Since the operation I also preserves the size of a set, we have:
|Ω0,G| = |T t(Ω0,G)| = |I(T t(Ω0,G))|, which is illustrated in figure 3.
Since Ω0,G ⊂ Ω0, we have |Ω0,G| ≤ |Ω0| and we already observed that the ratio
|Ω0|
|Ωt| ∼ 2−N (since each of the N particles can be in either half of the box in Ωt, but
only in one-half of the box in Ω0). Thus,
|I(T t(Ω0,G))|
|Ωt| =
|T t(Ω0,G)|
|Ωt| =
|Ω0,G|
|Ωt| ≤
|Ω0|
|Ωt| ∼ 2
−N , (11)
which is astronomically small for N ∼ 1023.
What one would like to show is that the good configurations are typical in the sense of
15 Which says that the Lebesgue measure of a set is invariant under the Hamiltonian flow T t, see e.g.
[1].
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(1). More precisely, one want to show that, for all times T not too large, and all t << T ,
|Ωt,G|
|Ωt| → 1 (12)
as N →∞.
6.3 Irreversibility and probabilistic explanations
The above explanation of the irreversible behavior of Ft is again probabilistic: the vast
majority of microstates x(0) corresponding to the macrostate F0 induce, through their
deterministic evolution x(0)→ T t(x(0)) = x(t), the expected time evolution of F0 → Ft.
What else could one ask for? One could wish to show that the expected time evolution
of F0 → Ft is induced by all microstates x(0) corresponding to the macrostate F0. But
we showed by explicit counterexamples that, in general, this is not possible.
So, our explanation is the best one can hope for. But is it satisfactory? It is, provided
that one accepts the notion of probabilistic explanation given in section 5. And if one
does not accept it, it is not clear what notion of explanation one has in mind and how
one could justify it. Nevertheless, by speaking of a “vast majority of microstates”, we did
not say what we meant by the “vast majority”. Since there are uncountably many such
states one needs a measure on Ω in order to make sense of that notion.
The measure on subsets of Ω that we used implicitly here is the size of the set or its
Lebesgue measure.16 But one could still ask: why use that measure and not some other
measure? Obviously if one could not argue that this measure is in some sense “natural”,
our whole notion of explanation would collapse. Indeed, it is easy to invent measures that
will give a much greater weight to, for example, the set Ω0\Ω0,G than to Ω0,G. Then, if we
define the probability of a set according to such a measure, the usual induced evolution
F0 → Ft becomes improbable and some other evolution becomes probable.
So something has to be said in favor of the naturalness of the Lebesgue measure. But
that is easy enough on Bayesian grounds or on the basis of the indifference principle:
16 If Ω is a set of measure zero in R6N , for example a constant energy surface, one has to consider
the restriction of the Lebesgue measure to that surface instead of the Lebesgue measure on R6N . This
measure is called the Liouville measure.
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the Lebesgue measure is the most symmetric one, being invariant under translations and
rotations and varying naturally under scalings. So, from that point of view, there is no
alternative to taking the Lebesgue measure as our natural measure and, if the set of initial
states inducing the expected evolution of Ft has a high probability relative to that measure
(i.e. are typical relative to that measure), then we will consider that the evolution of Ft
has been explained by the microscopic laws.
Some people want to justify the naturalness of the Lebesgue measure by invoking the
fact that it is time-invariant under the Hamiltonian flow (Liouville’s theorem). While this
is true, it is not necessarily the best argument in favor of the naturalness of the Lebesgue
measure. Indeed there exists non-Hamiltonian systems, for which the Lebesgue measure
is not invariant and that do possess an invariant measure ν whose support is a set A of
zero Lebesgue measure. Moreover, one can, in certain cases, prove that, for almost every
initial condition x0 with respect to the Lebesgue measure on a set of non-zero Lebesgue
measure containing A, the time evolution x0 → xt drives the trajectory towards A and
the statistics of the time spent by the trajectory close to subsets of A is proportional to
the ν-measure of those subsets.17
In the following section we will illustrate the previous ideas in a concrete situation.
7 The Kac ring model
7.1 The model
Let us consider a simple model, due to Mark Kac ([16] p.99, see also Thompson ([24] p.23)
and [11]), which nicely illustrates Boltzmann’s solution to the problem of irreversibility,
and shows how to avoid various misunderstandings and paradoxes.
We will use a slightly modified version of the model and state the relevant results,
referring to [16] for the proofs.
One considers N equidistant points on a circle; M of the intervals between the points
are marked and form a set called S. The complementary set (of N −M intervals) will be
17 We think here of certain “chaotic” dynamical systems for which ν is a Sinai-Ruelle-Bowen measure
and the set A is a “strange attractor”, see e.g. [3, 4, 10, 23, 20, 21].
24 7 The Kac ring model
Fig. 4: At each site i there is a particle that has either a plus or minus sign. During an
elementary time interval each particle moves clockwise to the nearest site. If the
particle crosses an interval marked with a cross (as the one between the sites i
and i+ 1), it changes sign but if it crosses an interval without a cross (as the one
between the sites i+ 1 and i+ 2) it does not change its sign.
called S¯. We will define
α =
M
N
. (13)
It will be convenient later to assume that
α <
1
2
. (14)
Each of the N points there is a particle that can have either a plus sign or minus sign
(in the original Kac model, one speaks of white and black balls). During an elementary
time interval each particle moves clockwise to the nearest site, obeying the following rule:
if the particle crosses an interval in S, it changes sign upon completing the move but if it
crosses an interval in S¯, it performs the move without changing sign.
Suppose that we start with all particles having a plus sign; the question is what
happens after a large number of moves. After (18) we shall also consider other initial
conditions.
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To formalize the model, introduce for each i = 1, . . . , N , the variable18
i =
 +1 if the interval in front of i ∈ S¯−1 if the interval in front of i ∈ S
and we let ηi(t) = ±1 be the sign of the particle at site i and time t.
Then, we get the “equations of motion”:
ηi+1(t+ 1) = ηi(t)i. (15)
Let us first explain the analogy with mechanical laws. The particles are described by
their positions and their (discrete) “velocity”, namely their sign. One of the simplifying
features of the model is that the “velocity” does not affect the motion. The only reason one
calls it a “velocity” is that it changes when the particle collides with a fixed “scatterer”,
i.e. an interval in S. Scattering with fixed objects tends to be easier to analyse than
collisions between particles. The “equations of motion” (15) are given by the clockwise
motion, plus the changing of signs. These equations are obviously deterministic and
reversible: if, after a time t, we change the orientation of the motion from clockwise to
counterclockwise, we return after t steps to the original state.19 Moreover, the motion
is strictly periodic: after 2N steps each interval has been crossed twice by each particle,
hence they all come back to their original sign.20
It is also easy to find special configurations which obviously do not tend to equilibrium:
start with all particles being “plus” and let every other interval belong to S (with M = N
2
).
Then, after two steps, all particles are minus, after four steps they are all plus again, etc...
The motion is periodic with period 4, see figure 5 for a simple example.
Turning to the solution, one can start by analyzing the approach to equilibrium in
this model a` la Boltzmann.
18 See for example figure 4 where i = −1 and i+1 = +1.
19 There is a small abuse here, because it seems that we change the laws of motion by changing the
orientation (from clockwise to counterclockwise). But one can attach another discrete “velocity” param-
eter to the particles, having the same value for all of them, and indicating the orientation, clockwise or
counterclockwise, of their motion. Then, the motion is truly reversible, and we have simply to assume
that the analogue here of the operation I of (9) changes also that extra velocity parameter.
20 This is analogous to the Poincare´ cycles in mechanics, except that, here, the length of the cycle is
the same for all configurations (there is no reason for this feature to hold in general mechanical systems).
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Fig. 5: An example of distribution of crosses where every configuration is periodic of period
4.
7.2 Analogue of Boltzmann’s solution.
Let N+(t), (N−(t)) denote the total number of “plus” particles or “minus” particles at
time t (i.e., after t moves; t being an integer). N+(t) and (N−(t)) are the macroscopic
variables in this problem (since N+(t) + (N−(t)) = N there is only one independent
macroscopic variable).
Let N+(S; t), N−(S; t)) be the number of “plus” particles or of “minus” particles which
are going to cross an interval in S at time t.
We have the immediate conservation relations:
N+(t+ 1) = N+(t)−N+(S; t) +N−(S; t)
N−(t+ 1) = N−(t)−N−(S; t) +N+(S; t) (16)
If we want to solve (16), we have to make some assumption about N+(S; t), N−(S; t).
Otherwise, one has to write down equations for N+(S; t), N−(S; t) that will involve new
variables and lead to a potentially infinite regress.
So, following Boltzmann, we introduce the assumption (“Stosszahlansatz” or “hypoth-
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esis of molecular chaos”21):
N+(S; t) = αN+(t)
N−(S; t) = αN−(t), (17)
with α defined in (13).
The intuitive justification for this assumption is that each particle is “uncorrelated”
with the event “the interval ahead of the particle belongs to S”, so we write N+(S; t) as
equal to N+(t), the total number of “plus” particles, times the density α of intervals in
S. This assumption looks completely reasonable. However, upon reflection, it may lead
to some puzzlement: what does “uncorrelated” exactly mean? Why do we introduce a
statistical assumption in a mechanical model? Fortunately here, these questions can be
answered precisely and we shall answer them later by solving the model exactly. But let
us return to the Boltzmannian story.
One obtains from (17):
N+(t+ 1)−N−(t+ 1) = (1− 2α)(N+(t)−N−(t))
Thus
N−1[N+t)−N−(t)] = (1− 2α)tN−1[N+(0)−N−(0)],
= (1− 2α)t. (18)
since N+(0) = N , N−(0) = 0.
Using (14) and (18), we obtain a monotonic approach to equal number of particles
“plus” and particles “minus”, i.e. to equilibrium. Note that we get a monotonic approach
for all initial conditions (N+(0)−N−(0)) of the particles.
We can see here in what sense Boltzmann’s solution is an approximation. The assump-
tion (17) cannot hold for all times and for all configurations, because it would contradict
the reversibility and the periodicity of the motion. However, we will show now that the
fact that it is an approximation does not invalidate Boltzmann’s ideas about irreversibility.
21 The word “chaos” here has nothing to do with “chaos theory”, in the sense of dynamical systems
(see footnote 16), and, of course, Boltzmann’s hypothesis is much older than that theory.
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7.3 Microscopic analysis of the model.
Let us reexamine the model at the microscopic level, first mechanically and then statisti-
cally. The solution of the equations of motion (15) is:
ηi(t) = ηi−t(0)i−1i−2 · · · i−t (19)
(where the subtractions in the indices are done modulo N). So we have an explicit solution
of the equations of motion at the microscopic level.
We can express the macroscopic variables in terms of that solution:
N+(t)−N−(t) =
n∑
i=1
ηi(t) =
n∑
i=1
ηi−t(0)i−1i−2 · · · i−t (20)
and we want to compute N−1(N+(t) − N−(t)) for large N , for various choices of initial
conditions {ηi(0)}Ni=1 and various sets S (determining the i’s). It is here that “statistical”
assumptions enter. Namely, we fix an arbitrary initial condition {ηi(0)}Ni=1 and consider
all possible sets S with M = αN fixed (one can of course think of the choice of S as being
part of the choice of initial conditions). Then, for each set S, one computes the “curve”
N−1(N+(t)−N−(t)) as a function of time.
The result of the computation, done in [16], is that, for any given t and for N large,
the overwhelming majority of these curves will approach (1− 2α)t, i.e. what is predicted
by (18). (to fix ideas, Kac suggests to think of N as being of the order 1023 and t of order
106). The fraction of all curves that will deviate significantly from (1− 2α)t, for fixed t,
goes to zero as N−
1
2 , when N →∞.
Of course when we say “compute”, one should rather say that one makes an estimate
of the fraction of curves deviating from (1 − 2α)t at a fixed t. This estimate is similar
to the law of large numbers since (20) is of the form of a sum of (almost independent)
random variables.
Let us express what happens in this model in terms of the sets depicted in figure 3.
The “phase space” Ω consists of all configurations of signs and scatterers (with 2M < N),
{i, ηi}Ni=1.
The “thermal equilibrium” set in figure 3 corresponds to the set of configurations
of particles such that N−1(N+(t) − N−(t)) is approximately equal to 0 and to the set of
configurations of scatterers such that N−1(N+(t)−N−(t)) remains close to 0 in the future.
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It is easy to compute the number of (microscopic) configurations whose number of
“plus” particles is N+(t). It is given by: N
N+(t)
 = N !
N+(t)!(N −N+(t))! (21)
and this number reaches its maximum value for N+ =
N
2
= N−.
We can, as in figure 1, introduce a partition of the phase space according to the different
values of N+, N−. And what (21) shows is that different elements of that partition have
very different number of elements, the vast majority corresponding to “equilibrium”, i.e.
to those near N+ =
N
2
= N−.
If one illustrates this model through figure 3, the set Ω0 consists of all configurations
of scatterers and of all particles being “plus”: ηi = +1, ∀i = 1, . . . , N . The subset
Ω0,G ⊂ Ω0 of good configurations consists of those configurations of scatterers such that
N−1(N+(t)−N−(t)) tends to 0 and of all the particles having a plus sign.
Then T t(Ω0,G) ⊂ Ωt is a set of configurations with N−1(N+(t)−N−(t)) approximately
equal to 0 but a set of scatterers that is special in the following sense: the configura-
tions in I(T t(Ω0,G)), where I changes the orientation of the motion from clockwise to
counterclockwise, will evolve in a time t to a configuration with all particles being plus.
So, although, as far as the signs of the particles are concerned, there is nothing special
about the configurations in T t(Ω0,G) (N
−1(N+(t)−N−(t)) is close to 0), there is a subtle
correlation between the configurations of the particles and the scatterers in T t(Ω0,G),
as shown by what happens if one applies the orientation-reversal operation I to those
configurations. This is simply a “memory effect” due to the fact that the configurations
in T t(Ω0,G) were initially in Ω0 ⊃ Ω0,G (this is similar to the memory effect of the particles
of the gas in section 6 that were initially in one half of the box).
But the configurations in T t(Ω0,G) form a very small subset of Ωt; indeed, |T t(Ω0,G)| =
|Ω0,G| ≤ |Ω0|, and |Ω0||Ω| = 2−N (because there are two possible signs in Ω for each of the
N sites, but only one sign, plus, in Ω0). By the law of large numbers one can show that
|Ωt| ∼ |Ω| for N large, so that, |Ω0||Ωt| ∼ 2−N , again for N large and thus
|Ω0|
|Ωt| is extremely
small in that limit.
Note that here, we define typical behavior by counting the number of configurations,
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see (21), which is the same as putting a probability equal to 1
2
to each particle sign (note
also that, in the estimates made on (20), we had implicitly put a probability equal to 1
2
to the presence or not of a scatterer on each interval). This uniform probability is again
the one following from the indifference principle.
I do not want to overemphasize the interest of the Kac model. It has many simpli-
fying features (for example, there is no conservation of momentum; the scatterers here
are “fixed”). However, it has all the properties that have been invoked to show that me-
chanical systems cannot behave irreversibly, and therefore it is a perfect counterexample
that allows us to refute all those arguments (and to understand exactly what is wrong
with them): it is isolated (the particles plus the scatterers), deterministic, reversible and
periodic.22
This result, obtained in the Kac model, is exactly what one would like to show for
general mechanical systems, in order to establish irreversibility. It is obvious why this is
very hard. In general, one does not have an explicit solution (for an N -body system!)
such as (15, 19), in terms of which the macroscopic variables can be expressed, as in (20).
If we prepare a Kac model many times and if the only variables that we can control
are N and M , then we expect to see the irreversible behavior obtained above, simply
because this is what happens deterministically for the vast majority of microscopic initial
conditions corresponding to the macroscopic variables that we are able to control.
7.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we recalled the more or less standard “Boltzmannian” derivation of macro-
scopic laws from microscopic ones. But since this derivation appeals to probabilistic
notions, we tried to relate those notions with the issue of what constitutes a valid expla-
nation in the natural sciences.
We claim that one explains a macroscopic behavior on the basis of microscopic laws if,
given a macrostate F0, the overwhelming majority of microstates corresponding to F0 give
22 Periodicity is a stronger property than the existence of Poincare´ cycles and implies that the system
is not ergodic. For a discussion of why ergodicity is neither necessary to sufficient in order to justify
approach to equilibrium, see [5, section 4.2].
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rise, through their deterministic evolution, to an induced evolution F0 → Ft in accordance
with the macroscopic law.
We also tried to clarify the status of our “ignorance” in these explanations. It is true
that we ignore the initial conditions of the microstates of our system or the details of their
time evolution, but what we argued in this paper is that this ignorance does not prevent
us from understanding why the system tends towards equilibrium, again because this is
result of the deterministic evolution of the overwhelming majority of the microstates.
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